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Abstract
We develop a search-matching model, where firms search for customers (e.g. in form 
of advertising). Firms use long-term contracts and bargain over prices, resulting in a 
price mark up above marginal cost, which is procyclical and depends on firms’ 
relative bargaining power. Product market frictions decrease the steady state 
equilibrium, improve the cyclical properties of the model and provide a more realistic 
picture of firms’ business environment. This suggests that product market frictions 
may well be crucial in explaining business cycle fluctuations. Finally, we also show 
that welfare costs of price rigidities are negligible relative to welfare costs of frictions. 
Keywords: Business cycle, Frictions, Product market, Price bargain 
JEL Classification: E10, E31, E32 5
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Non-technical summary
In the Walrasian real business cycle model (RBC), the product market is perfectly competitive
and all adjustments occur without frictions. This may however be considered too simplis-
tic a world. Empirical evidence suggests that most ﬁrms operate in imperfectly competitive
markets, where they have some pricing power, and form long-term relationships with their
customers, which are predominantly other ﬁrms. These relationships are typically governed
by implicit or explicit contracts. Available evidence also shows that ﬁrms produce substantial
effort, typically in form of advertising or marketing, to ﬁnd new customers and sell their prod-
ucts to. For instance, in the US total advertising expenditures have been close to 2.5% of GDP
over the last 10 years.
This paper aims to account for those stylized facts and provide a more realistic story of business
relationships and the price formation mechanism. To this end, we depart from the Walrasian
RBC model in two aspects. First, we replace the perfectly competitive market assumption
standard to the RBC model and develop a search-matching model à la Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides, where ﬁrms produce effort (search, advertising) to form long-term contractual rela-
tionships and bargain over prices. In our approach, downstream producers act as wholesalers
and bargain over prices with upstream retailers who in turn sell to ﬁnal consumers. Retailers
act as intermediaries between producers and consumers; they alleviate the search costs for ﬁnal
consumers. We believe that this is fair characterization of most product markets in industrial-
ized economies. Only in very special markets do producers sell directly to consumers without
intermediaries. Second, we introduce rigidities into a price bargaining process. We therefore
provide a story how wholesalers and retailers meet in the market and for the subsequent price
formation mechanism between them.
Our key ﬁndings are as follows: First, the price bargain results in mark up pricing above
marginal cost. The mark up is procyclical and depends on the relative bargaining power of
the wholesalers and the retailers. The procyclicality of the mark up arises even without price
rigidities. Second, introducing frictions in the product market decreases the steady state equi-
librium and improves the cyclical properties. More precisely, frictions (i) increase employment
volatility, (ii) break the strong correlation between variables observed in the standard RBC
model, (iii) increase output persistence, (iv) generate hump-shape impulse response functions
for all variables and (v) provide a realistic description of advertising and price behavior. Our
frictions in the product market may therefore be crucial (and maybe more crucial than frictions
in the labor market or frictions between retailers and consumers) in explaining business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Third, price rigidities only have a weak effect on the cyclical properties of other
variables, and welfare costs of price rigidities are negligible relative to welfare costs of frictions.6
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1 Introduction
In the standard Walrasian real business cycle model (hereafter RBC, see for instance King and
Rebelo (1999) for an in depth exposition), the product market is perfectly competitive and ad-
justments occur without frictions. However, empirical evidence clearly shows that this may
be considered too simplistic a world. Empirical evidence suggests that most ﬁrms operate in
imperfectly competitive markets, where they have some power of setting prices themselves,
and form long-term relationships with their customers, which are predominantly other ﬁrms.
These relationships are typically governed by implicit or explicit contracts. Available evidence
also shows that ﬁrms produce substantial effort, typically in form of advertising or marketing,
to ﬁnd new customers and sell their products to. For instance, in the US total advertising ex-
penditures have been close to 2.5% of GDP over the last 10 years. This effort may also cause an
economic chain reaction by increasing sales, consumption and employment.
Given the above stylised facts evidence, this paper aims to provide a more realistic story of
business relationships and price formation mechanism. We develop a search-matching model,
where ﬁrms produce effort (search, advertising) to form long-term contractual relationships
and bargain over prices with their customers. Our model only departs from the standard RBC
model in two aspects. First, we replace the Walrasian product market of the standard business
cycle model with a product market with frictions by following Pissarides (2000) and the as-
sociated search-matching literature. In our model, downstream producers act as wholesalers
and bargain over prices with upstream retailers, who in turn sell to ﬁnal consumers. Retailers
act as intermediaries between producers and consumer; they alleviate the search costs for ﬁnal
consumers. We believe that this is fair characterization of most product markets in industrial-
ized economies. Only in very special markets do producers sell directly to consumers without
intermediaries. Second, we introduce rigidities into a price bargaining process.
With respect to the ﬁrst departure from the RBC model, in the original search environment
developed by Pissarides, Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and others, the focus is on the labor
market, where ﬁrms’ and unemployed people’s decisions to open vacancies and to search for
jobs are used as complementary inputs into an aggregate matching function. In this paper,
we follow the same approach, but transfer the frictions into the product market. Wholesalers
produce effort (e.g. advertising or marketing) to ﬁnd retailers to sell their products to. Retail-
ers produce effort (e.g. by employing purchasing managers) to ﬁnd wholesalers to buy their
products from in order to reﬁll their stores and enlarge their selection. The amount of products
exchanged therefore depends on their respective search efforts. Moreover, every buyer-seller
contact generates a surplus over which the wholesaler and the retailer bargain. We therefore
provide a story how wholesalers and retailers meet in the market and for the subsequent price
formation mechanism between them. Regarding the second departure from the RBC model,7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1036
March 2009
the empirical evidence summarized in section 2 shows very persuasively that most ﬁrms’ main
business customers are other ﬁrms, with whom they engage in long-term relationships, which
are often governed by explicit or implicit contracts. In particular, Zbaracki et al. (2004) provide
compelling evidence in favor of substantial customer negotiation costs, which are convex in the
size of the price adjustment. Still, our model makes use of a simple representation and remains
very close to the standard RBC model. We provide an in depth exploration of the RBC and
welfare properties, and ﬁnd that adding frictions and price bargaining in the product market
(between wholesalers and retailers) improves correlations between real data and the model,
even more so than introducing frictions and bargaining into other markets, instead.
Most papers introducing imperfections in the product market assume monopolistic whole-
salers, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Messina (2006) or the recent DSGE literature (see for
instance Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003)). Alternatively, in Fagnart et al.
(2007), wholesalers experience privately observed and uninsured idiosyncratic shocks, which
generates a sub-optimal equilibrium. But none of these approaches allow for bilateral relation-
ships and negotiations between wholesalers and retailers. Very recent related approaches that
aim at providing better descriptions of customer-ﬁrm relationships are those by Hall (2008),
Arsenau and Chugh (2007) and Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007). Hall (2008) explores customer
search and seller recruiting by adapting principles of the labour market search and matching
models to the product market. In his model, producers invest heavily in attracting ﬁnal cus-
tomers, as they receive a large share of the surplus. Hall’s approach is concerned with retail
markets, and there are frictions but no bargaining between customers and sellers. Arsenau and
Chugh (2007) extend Hall’s model and explore the effects of different bargaining assumptions.
They speciﬁcally set out to analyse how the distributive role of prices through the notion of
fairness affects price dynamics. In Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007), customers incur switching
costs. Customers and ﬁrms form long-term relationships and idiosyncratic marginal shocks are
only incompletely passed through into prices. However, all three approaches are concerned
with the relationship between retail ﬁrms and ﬁnal consumers, whereas our model provides
a story of ﬁrms’ relationships and of the price formation process, and compares simulation
results to real data.
We acknowledge that the model in this paper can only provide a very simplistic view of what
in reality can be considered a rather complex relationship between buyer and seller. Clearly,
contracting parties do not only specify prices in their contracts, but also quantities, discounts,
after sales services, etc... However, we believe that the agreed price is the most fundamental
of these contractual speciﬁcations; without it there is no trade of goods, not even in a barter
economy. This is precisely why we focus on this particular aspect and abstract from all other
product market contractual issues.
Our key ﬁndings are as follows: First, the price bargain results in mark up pricing above8
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marginal cost. The mark up is procyclical and depends on the relative bargaining power of the
wholesalersand the retailers. The procyclicality of the mark up arises evenwithout price rigidi-
ties. Second, introducing frictions in the product market decreases the steady state equilibrium
and improves the cyclical properties. More precisely, frictions (i) increase employment volatil-
ity, (ii) break the strong correlation between variables observed in the standard RBC model, (iii)
increase output persistence, (iv) generate hump-shaped IRF’s for all variables and (v) provide
a realistic description of advertising and price behavior. Our frictions in the product market be-
tween wholesalers and producers may therefore well be crucial (and maybe more crucial than
frictions in the labour market) in explaining business cycle ﬂuctuations. Third, price rigidities
only have a weak effect on the cyclical properties of other variables, and welfare costs of price
rigidities are negligible relative to welfare costs of frictions.
Section 2 provides some selective evidence on the product market functioning and further mo-
tivation of this paper. Sections 3 and 4 develop and discuss the search-matching model with
frictions in the product market and price bargain. Sections 5 and 6 present the calibration and
some numerical simulations for US data. Section 7 computes the welfare costs of the different
inefﬁciencies and section 8 concludes.
2 On ﬁrms’ business environment
It is widely accepted that most ﬁrms operate in markets, which are governed by imperfections
or frictions. By providing search effort ﬁrms try to overcome market imperfections. This is
motivated by recent evidence, in particular from recent ﬁrm surveys. Following the lead by
Blinder et al. (1998) ﬁrm surveys have been conducted for several industrial countries/areas
over the last decade, which improved our understanding of ﬁrms’ business environment and
price setting practices.1 According to those surveys, it seems that a fair characterisation of a
typical or representative ﬁrm’s business environment is that it operates an imperfectly compet-
itive market and uses some form of mark up pricing above marginal cost as its predominant
form of price-setting practice, thereby implying that it is able exert some market power.2 This
ﬁrm engages in business-to-business (B2B) rather than business-to-consumer (B2C) relation-
ships, where it typically does most business with repeat customers and forms long-term rela-
tionships with them. A long-term relationship, which can also be regarded as one form of an
implicit contract based on principles of trust and fairness, is an effective way to reduce search
cost, which the ﬁrm otherwise would have to bear. Together, these surveys provide a strik-
ingly coherent set of empirical results and a challenge to many modelling assumptions usually
1See Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada, Fabiani et al. (2006, 2007) for 9 euro area (EA) countries, Nakagawa et al.
(2000) for Japan, Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden and Hall et al. (2000) for the UK.
2For example, 54% of euro area ﬁrms answered that they use a mark up pricing strategy. 73% of euro area ﬁrms
said that their main market is the domestic market. In Canada, the corresponding ﬁgure is 81%.9
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employed in standard Walrasian macroeconomic models.
To substantiate the above points, consider that in the US, 85% of ﬁrms surveyed by Blinder et al.
(1998) indicate that they mainly engage in long-term relationships with their customers. 77%
of their main customers are other ﬁrms. The corresponding ﬁgures for other industrialised
economies are of similar magnitudes (EA 70% and Sweden 86% for the share of long-term
customers and 75 and 70% for the share of other ﬁrms as main customers). Furthermore, these
long-term relationships are mainly governed by contracts. 50% of US ﬁrms responded that
they have 60% or more of their sales covered by explicit or written contracts, which according
to Blinder et al. (1998) is estimated to correspond to 38% of US GDP. The predominant share of
contracts (75%) set prices; the contracts typically last one year (both the median and the mode
are 12 months whereas the average is 20 months). Furthermore 64% of ﬁrms indicated that they
have implicit contracts with their customers, i.e. an implicit understanding not to raise prices
when the market is tight. Given this structure of ﬁrms’ business relationships, it is therefore
not surprising that both explicit and implicit contracts consistently appear among the mostly
frequently recognized reasons for not changing prices. Explicit contracts are judged to be an
important or very important source of price stickiness by 37% (GDP weighted) of US ﬁrms.
Furthermore, this theory is of more importance for ﬁrms that are primarily engaged in B2B
relationships. Surveys for other industrialised countries generally corroborate these ﬁndings
(see Amirault et al. (2004), Apel et al. (2005) and Fabiani et al. (2006, 2007)).
Since the product market is necessarily imperfect, there is a need for search of customers, and
thus advertising and marketing effort, and a need for search of suppliers. The need for adver-
tising, marketing, promotions, public relations, and sales managers provided almost 600,000
jobs in 2006. Similarly, roughly an equally large number of people were engaged in purchasing
and buying occupations (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). This represents almost 0.5% of total
US employment for each. And still in the US, total annual expenditures in advertising in all
the media represented on average 2.5% of GDP over the last decades. In other words, adver-
tising expenditures amounted to 271 billions US dollars in 2005. Figure 1 also shows that over
the economic cycle, advertising expenditures are positively correlated with GDP, have a higher
volatility than GDP, especially over the last years, and are very persistent. This ﬁgure includes
spending for advertising in newspapers, magazines, radio, television, direct mail, billboards
and displays, Internet, and other forms, and thus also includes the advertising that is directly
targeted towards ﬁnal consumers, such as car manufacturers’ or pharmaceuticals’ television
adverts.3 Although producers may directly target consumers, consumers buy via intermedi-
aries and hence advertising towards consumers indirectly affects retailers.
Given the importance of contracts, what are the costs of adjusting prices and how are they
3Source: www.galbithink.org/ad-spending.htm.10
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Sources: www.galbithink.org/ad-spending.htm. The yearly nominal series are GDP-deﬂated, logged and HP-ﬁltered (λ = 100)
to extract the business cycle components.
Figure 1: Cyclical ﬂuctuations of real advertising expenditures
negotiated? Here, the most compelling evidence is reported by Zbaracki et al. (2004) for one
large US industrial manufacturing ﬁrm. They differentiate between physical costs (i.e. menu
costs), managerial costs (i.e. information gathering, decision making and internal communica-
tion costs) and customer costs (i.e. customer communication and price negotiation costs) and
estimate the latter to be 20 times the size of the menu costs, thus accounting for almost 75% of
the total price adjustment cost. The required (re-)negotiation of prices with customers, in par-
ticular, is reported to be very costly when changing prices, as the negotiations require tailoring
to each customer and a substantial time and manpower effort (costs for visiting customers, time
spent for the preparing price offers, negotiating prices, actual travel). In case of a price increase
it is reported that 60% plus of the key customers require further negotiations. Thus, price nego-
tiations can be regarded the rule rather than the exception; they act as a source of price rigidity.
Finally, Zbaracki et al. (2004) report that managerial and customer costs are convex in the size
of the price adjustment, while menu costs are not.
This paper aims at providing a story of the price formation mechanism between ﬁrms. Given
the presented evidence further investigations of these relationships in general and their price
formation mechanism in particular seem warranted. In this respect, both the reported impor-
tance and the convexity of the negotiation costs is very interesting. It runs somewhat counter
to recent evidence on micro consumer prices suggesting very infrequent and sizable price ad-
justment (see Bils and Klenow (2004); Dhyne et al. (2006)). However, recent evidence on the
frequency and the size of individual producer price adjustments points toward comparatively
more frequent, but smaller price adjustments (see Vermeulen et al. (2007)), which is consistent
with a substantial proportion of adjustment costs being convex, as argued to be the case in
Zbaracki et al. (2004).11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1036
March 2009
3 Model
There are three types of agents in the economy: households, wholesale ﬁrms and retail ﬁrms.
Goods are produced by wholesale ﬁrms and consumed by households. However, conversely
to the standard real business cycle literature, we do not assume that products are directly ex-
changed between producers and consumers; instead we introduce retailers as intermediaries.
Retailers buy from producers, who act as wholesalers, and sell to households. Trade frictions
are present in the product market between wholesalers and retailers, and we provide an ex-
plicit theory of price determination since every wholesaler-retailer cont(r)act generates a sur-
plus over which ﬁrms bargain. More precisely, the product market consists of a two-sided
search market between sellers (wholesale ﬁrms) and buyers (retail ﬁrms). Let Tt be the number
of contracts between wholesale-retail pairs at period t, a contract meaning that both parties
agree to exchange one unit of output. These contracts terminate and the pairs separate at the
exogenous rate 0 < χ < 1. The contract duration is, thus, on average given by d = 1/χ.
This results in a continuous depletion of the stock of contracts, and thus trade volume, and
consequently a need to reﬁll it. In order to do so, wholesale ﬁrms provide a search effort St
(marketing or advertising expenditures) to ﬁnd new buyers; and retail ﬁrms provide a search
effort Dt (by purchasing agents) to ﬁnd new sellers. The number of new matches between sell-
ers and buyers is increasing and concave in the search efforts, and assumed to be generated by
a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function:




t ,( 1 )
where ¯ m > 0a n d0< γ < 1. In analogy to the labour market, the relationship between the
search effort of wholesalers and retailers can be regarded as a product market equivalent of
the “Beveridge curve”. It has search effort of wholesalers on the vertical axis and search ef-
fort of retailers on the horizontal. It slopes downwards as wholesalers produce higher effort
(advertising) when retailers are reluctant buying goods. Downward and upward shifts in this
curve would signify structural improvements and deteriorations in the efﬁciency of the match-
ing process, respectively. Movements along the curve, in contrast, imply a cyclical adjustment
without alteration of the matching efﬁciency.
The trade volume evolves according to:
Tt =( 1− χ)Tt−1 + Mt.( 2 )
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of inﬁnitively lived households. Their time en-
dowment is normalized to 1 and split between work Nt and leisure 1− Nt. Their current utility12
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(1− Nt)1−η − 1

,( 3 )
where Ct represents consumption. Utility is assumed to be concave in its arguments and speci-
ﬁed as in King and Rebelo (1999): θ ≥ 0a n dη ≥ 0 is the parameter governing the labor supply
elasticity. Households receive an income from lending capital to wholesale ﬁrms at interest rate
rt + δ, and from working at a wage rate wt. In each period, they choose the size of the capital










subject to the constraints:
Ct + It = wtNt +( rt + δ)Kt + Πt,( 5 )
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,( 6 )
where β denotes the discount factor. Equation (5) is the budget constraint. Households own
both the wholesale and the retail ﬁrms and ultimately receive their proﬁts Πt. Equation (6) is
the capital accumulation equation and δ denotes the exogenous capital destruction rate. The













The economy is composed of a continuum of identical wholesale ﬁrms using capital Kt and
labor Nt to produce tradable products Tt, through a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Tt =  tKα
t N1−α
t ,( 9 )
where  t is a productivity shock and 0 < α < 1. Given the selling price Pt, the ﬁrms choose
their optimal search effort, i.e. level of advertising expenditures St to ﬁnd new buyers, as well
as the optimal capital-labor ratio to produce the output level Tt.T h e yt a k ea sg i v e nqS
t , the rate
at which every effort leads to a new match. The rate is deﬁned as:
qS
t = Mt/St.( 1 0 )
4One has to bear in mind that all future variables are actually conditional expectations based on the information
available at time t. For instance, Zt+j stands for Et(Zt+j),w h e r eZt may be any variable or combination of variables.
Our simpliﬁed notation is however easier to read.13
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subject to the constraints (2), (9) and (10). wt and rt +δ are respectively the labor and the capital
costs. We impose a quadratic search cost with κ ≥ 0 5 and a quadratic price adjustment cost









































The economy is also composed of a continuum of identical retail ﬁrms buying tradable prod-
ucts Tt, andsellingthemtohouseholds. Atgivenbuyingprice Pt, theﬁrms choosetheiroptimal
search effort Dt, i.e. by setting aside the necessary number of purchasing and buying employ-
ees, to ﬁnd and bargain with new wholesalers. They take as given qD
t , the rate at which every
effort leads to a new match. The rate is deﬁned as:
qD
t = Mt/Dt. (16)


















5See Merz (1995) for a similar approach in a business cycle model with frictions in the labor market.
6We here follow the elegant approach of Rotemberg (1982, 1983) and introduce price rigidities through convex
price adjustment costs. This approach is justiﬁed in section 2. An alternative would be to introduce price rigidities
through Taylor (1999) or Calvo (1983) contracts. At the macro level, both approaches are however equivalent.14
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subject to the constraints (2) and (16). We impose the same quadratic search cost as for whole-
sale ﬁrms with κ ≥ 0, and the same quadratic price adjustment cost as for wholesale ﬁrms with















Each product market match yields pure economic rents equal to the expected search costs for
wholesalers and retailers (including foregone proﬁts). The agreed price is such that these rents
are shared and in addition each party is compensated for its incurred costs of forming the
match. We follow the labour market literature (see for instance Pissarides (2000)) and assume
that the rent sharing is a solution to a Nash (1950) bargaining problem. More precisely, prices
are (re-)negotiated between wholesalers and retailers at the beginning of every period through
a Nash bargain over the surplus resulting from the match. Because all ﬁrms are identical, the



























































= −1+ φ(Pt−1 − Pt + βt(1− χ)(Pt+1 − Pt)). (24)









,( 2 5 )
which gives, using equations (21) and (22):
Pt = λΛt +( 1− λ).( 2 6 )15
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Prices are therefore a weighted average of the marginal cost and 1, and increasing (resp. de-
creasing) in the bargaining power of the wholesalers (resp. retailers). If wholesalers have no
bargaining power, the price is equal to their marginal cost. In all other cases, prices are a mark
up over marginal cost with the size of the mark up depending on ﬁrms’ relative bargaining
power.7 Also, we obtain that the mark up is procyclical, and this procyclicality would obvi-
ously increase with price rigidities.
3.5 Equilibrium deﬁnition




t=0 and a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞
t=0 = {Ct,Kt+1,St, Nt,Dt}∞
t=0 such that:
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {Ct,Kt+1}∞
t=0 are solutions to the household solu-
tion (7) and the product market law of motion (2)
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {St, Nt}∞
t=0 are solutions to the wholesaler solu-
tions (13) and (15)
- given a sequence of prices {Pr
t}∞
t=0, {Dt}∞
t=0 is solution to the retailer solution (18)
- given a sequence of quantities {Qt}∞
t=0, {rt,wt}∞
t=0 clear the capital market (5) and the
labour market (8)
- the price {Pt}∞
t=0 is set according to the Nash bargain solution (20)
4 Inefﬁciency sources
The economy we describe is characterised by three sources of inefﬁciency. The ﬁrst source is
search costs that induce an inefﬁciently low level of output. Proposition 1 shows that when
search costs disappear, the steady state tends to the Walrasian steady state: labor and capital
are priced at their respective marginal productivity, ﬁrms make no proﬁt and output is max-
imised8.
Proposition 1 (Search costs and Walrasian output)
When κ −→ 0 (no search costs), the steady state solution tends to the Walrasian one.
7Note that Pt represents a real producer price (price of ﬁnal/consumer products are still normalized to 1 as in a
standard real business cycle model). The mark up = Pt
Λt = λ + 1−λ
Λt and, following the terminology of Goodfriend
and King (1997), the marginal mark up is equal to the average mark up because all wages are (re-)negotiated every
period.
8Although the steady state tends to the Walrasian one, still the dynamics are different from the dynamics of a
standard Walrasian real business cycle.16
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Proof. When κ −→ 0, ﬁrst order conditions (13) and (18) simplify to P = Λ and P = 1.
Combining Λ = 1 with equations (14) and (15), we obtain w =( 1 − α) (K/N)α and r + δ =
α (K/N)α−1. This means that prices are normalized to 1, wages are equal to the marginal pro-
ductivity of labor and interest rates (incl. depreciation) are equal to the marginal productivity
of capital. Moreover, by replacing P, w, r + δ in equations (11) and (17) and using (9), we see
that proﬁts of wholesalers and retailers are equal to zero. This solution is therefore equivalent
to the Walrasian one.
The second source of inefﬁciency results from the search externalities. In a decentralized econ-
omy, search process exhibits externalities, and in most cases, the decentralized equilibrium is
different from the social planner’s equilibrium. With search frictions in the labor market, Ho-
sios (1990), in a static environment, and Merz (1995), in a dynamic environment, show that an
efﬁciency condition (workers’ bargaining power equal to unemployed’s elasticity in the match-
ing function) exists such that the externalities are internalized and the decentralized outcome
is strictly equivalent to the social planner’s outcome. In proposition 2, we show that a similar
condition exists when the search frictions are in the product market.
Proposition 2 (Externalities in the decentralized economy)
We assume φ = 0 (no price adjustment costs). When λ = 1 − γ, the decentralized equilibrium is
strictly equivalent to the social planner’s problem.
Proof. The social planner’s problem is solved in Appendix A and the equivalence between the
two solutions is proved.
As an immediate result, the decentralised equilibrium with price rigidities (φ > 0) is always
suboptimal. The third source of inefﬁciency is therefore the price adjustment costs. It is worth
mentioning that the ﬁrst two inefﬁciencies exist both in the short and the long run, whereas the
third inefﬁciency only exists in the short run (price adjustment costs do not affect the steady
state). In section 7, we quantify the size of these respective inefﬁciencies.
5 Calibration
The technology shock is the exogenous driving force and is assumed to be AR(1):
log( t)=ρ log( t−1)+u 
t,( 2 7 )
where ρ is the autoregressive parameter and u 
t ∼ N(0,σ2
 ). We consider two versions of the
model. We ﬁrst remove all the frictions in the product market to obtain a standard Walrasian
real business cycle model, where labor and capital are priced at their respective marginal pro-
ductivity and prices are normalized to 1 (the standard Walrasian real business cycle is pre-
sented in Appendix B). We then add frictions. In this case, labor and capital are priced below17
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their respective marginal productivity, prices are endogenous and lower than unity, ﬁrms make
proﬁts, and total output is lower than in the Walrasian case.
We calibrate our model on quarterly data to reproduce some stylized facts for the US econ-
omy. We follow King and Rebelo (1999) to calibrate the standard business cycle parameters
{β, δ, α, θ, η, ρ, σ}. The discount factor is calibrated to yield an average return to capi-
tal of 6.5% per annum: β = 1/(1 + 0.065/4). The annual rate of capital depreciation set to
10%, which gives δ = 0.1/4. We set α = 1/3, which is the standard value for the long run
capital income share. We assume that η = 1 in order to obtain a double log utility function:
U(Ct,1− Nt)=log(Ct)+θ log(1 − Nt). We choose θ = 3.3 to match N = 0.20, which means
that 20% of total available time is used for work. Finally, still as in King and Rebelo (1999), we
set ρ = 0.979 and σ  = 0.0072.
The other parameters {λ, γχ , κ, ¯ m, φ} are speciﬁc to the model with search frictions and
price rigidities. If retailers (wholesalers) have no bargaining power, i.e. no market power,
the wholesaler (retailer) appropriates all rents from the contractual relationship. In reality,
the bargaining power of retailers and wholesalers is in-between these extreme cases. It may
also vary across markets and depend for instance on the relative size of buyers and sellers
(and for example whether ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments have to be undertaken, which gives rise to
the classic hold up problem). Since we do not have any priors and data on “economy-wide”
bargaining power, we assume that wholesalers and retailers have the same bargaining power:
λ = 1 − λ = 0.5. In order to have a Pareto optimal outcome (see proposition 2), we impose
γ = 1 − λ = 0.5.9 Each wholesaler-retailer pair may separate with an exogenous probability.
We set this probability to χ = 0.2, meaning that the average duration of a pair is 5 quarters. This
averagedurationofacontractseemsplausiblewithregardtoempiricalevidence(seesection2).
We assume that advertising expenditures (κS2/2) represent 2.2% of GDP as observed in data
(see section 2), and that the probability for a wholesaler to ﬁnd a retailer is 85%, which results
in κ = 1.2 and ¯ m = 0.8. Finally, depending on the simulations, we assume that φ = 0 (no price
adjustment costs) or φ = 50 (price adjustment costs). This price adjustment cost represents on
average 0.005% of GDP, i.e. is about 500 times lower than advertising expenditures.
The parameters are displayed in table 1. The parameters in the ﬁrst line are common to both
models, with and without frictions. The parameters in the second line are speciﬁc to the model
with frictions.
9The calibration to obtain the Pareto outcome in a decentralized economy is standard in the matching literature.
See for instance Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) for such a calibration in a similar model but with frictions in the
labor market.18
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βδ α θ η ρσ  
0.984 0.025 0.33 3.3 1 0.979 0.0072
λγ χ κ ¯ m φ
0.5 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.6 0/50
Table 1: Parameter values
6 Simulations
We use an autoregressive productivity shock and simulate two different models: (i) the model
with frictions in the product market presented in section 3 (with no price adjustment costs) and
(ii) the same model but without frictions. This second model is therefore a standard Walrasian
real business cycle model, as presented in King and Rebelo (1999) (see Appendix B for an ex-
position of the equations). We use the same calibration for both models and compare results to
the business cycle characteristics of US data (see Appendix C). The simulation results as well
as the US statistics are reported in table 2 and ﬁgure 2.
As already stated in proposition 1, the introduction of frictions reduces the steady state of both
the quantity variables and the price variables (at the exception of the interest rate rt which is
only determined by the discount factor). In our calibration, total search costs only represent
4.4% of GDP, but removing these costs would increase GDP by almost 40%.
Table 2 and ﬁgure 2 also show that the Walrasian RBC model does a good job in reproducing
consumption and investment behaviour but suffers from some weaknesses: (i) employment is
not volatile enough, (ii) there is no strong endogenous persistence mechanism and (iii) there
are no smooth impulse responses (except for consumption and wages). The introduction of
frictions improves the statistics along all these dimensions. Because of the sluggish process to
create new matches, we increase persistence in output, which in turn increases the volatility of
all variables, and especially of employment (see table 2). It is therefore worth noting that em-
ployment volatility is mainly due to the search and matching approach, rather than to the price
formation mechanism. As displayed in ﬁgure 2, quite remarkably we obtain a hump-shaped
reaction for all variables. The very reason is that we have frictions between wholesalers and re-
tailers and these frictions therefore directly affect not only output but also all inputs in produc-
tion. With frictions in the labour market instead, we would be able to generate hump-shaped19
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RBC frictions US data RBC frictions
Pt 0.84 0.59 0.84
adt 0.01 2.57 4.93
GDPt 0.57 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ct 0.45 0.36 0.81 0.44 0.60
It 0.12 0.07 3.41 3.38 4.16
Nt 0.20 0.18 1.00 0.49 0.94
wt 1.90 1.36 0.64 0.54 0.57
rt 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.03 0.03
ﬁrst-order contemporaneous
autocorrelation correlation with output
US data RBC frictions US data RBC frictions
Pt 0.80 0.51 -0.17 -0.12
adt 0.88 0.55 0.77 0.27
GDPt 0.88 0.72 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ct 0.88 0.79 0.73 0.86 0.94 0.70
It 0.92 0.71 0.70 0.94 0.99 0.88
Nt 0.94 0.71 0.41 0.83 0.97 0.42
wt 0.81 0.76 0.88 0.24 0.98 0.90
rt 0.55 0.71 0.67 -0.06 0.96 0.87
All variables have been logged (with the exception of the real interest rate) and detrended with the HP ﬁlter. US data: see
Appendix C; RBC: standard Walrasian real business cycle model àl aKing and Rebelo (1999) presented in Appendix B; frictions:
model with frictions in the product market presented in section 3. Pt : real producer price, adt = κS2
t /2 : advertising expenditures,
GDPt = Ct + It : gross domestic product, Ct : consumption, It : investment, Nt : employment, wt :w a g e ,rt : interest rate.
Table 2: Steady state and cyclical properties20
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reactions for employment but neither for investment nor output (it would be possible but by
adding further frictions as capital adjustment costs). This suggests that frictions in the product
market might be more crucial than frictions in the labour market in explaining business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Finally, we are able to reproduce statistical properties of real producer prices (less
volatile than output and slightly countercyclical) and advertising expenditures (more volatile
than output and procyclical) observed in data, suggesting that search is an interesting repre-
sentation of the product market.
Price adjustment costs
In the baseline setup, prices are bargained every period without any cost (φ = 0), that gen-
erates a strong - negative - reaction of prices. However, prices may be subject to adjustment
costs which need to be born by the ﬁrms (convex price adjustment costs àl aRotemberg in our
case). Figure 2 shows that adding price adjustment costs (φ = 50) smooths the price reaction
and stimulates advertising expenditures and the economy (consumption - investment - em-
ployment). The quantitative effects of price adjustment costs are however weak (and we show
in the next section that the welfare costs of price rigidities are almost negligible).
7 Welfare cost of inefﬁciencies
To compute the welfare cost of the different inefﬁciencies presented in section 4, we follow
Lucas (1987) and calculate the welfare cost as a fraction of the consumption a household would
agree to give up each period in return for moving to the efﬁcient situation. We deﬁne the





t+1.( 2 8 )






If the welfare cost of living in the inefﬁcient economy is ψ, equation (29) can be rewritten as:
Wi




By subtracting equation (28) from equation (30), we obtain the welfare cost of the inefﬁciency:
ψ = 1− exp((1− β)(Wi
t −We
t)).( 3 1 )
We use a second order approximation of equation (31) to avoid the certainty equivalence prop-
erty. We ﬁrst consider the search cost inefﬁciency. The efﬁcient situation We
t is considered when
the search cost parameter κ is equal to zero (Walrasian steady state, see proposition 1). We then21
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a productivity shock22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1036
March 2009
increase κ and compute Wi
t for each value of κ. The function ψ(κ) increases in κ, as displayed
in ﬁgure 3. With our calibration (κ = 1.5, see table 1), an household would be willing to give
up 3% of her consumption each quarter to live in the efﬁcient/Walrasian world.
We then consider the search externality inefﬁciency. We show in proposition 2 that when the
retailer’s bargaining power λ is equal to her search elasticity 1 − γ in the matching function,
the decentralised solution is equivalent to the social planner’s solution. This is our efﬁcient
solution We
t. We then move the bargaining power λ from 0.1 to 0.9 and compute Wi
t for each
valueof λ. Weobtain ψ(λ), asdisplayedinﬁgure4. Weseethat ψ(λ)=0whenλ = 1−γ = 0.5
(see calibration in table 1). The welfare cost increases when the distance between the bargaining
power and the matching elasticity increases. For instance, with a bargaining power of 0.2 or
0.8, an household would be willing to give up 2% of her consumption each quarter to live in
the social planner’s world.
We ﬁnally consider the price rigidity inefﬁciency. When φ = 0, prices are fully ﬂexible; this
is our efﬁcient economy We
t. We then increase φ and compute Wi
t. W es e ei nﬁ g u r e5t h a t
the welfare cost increases with the price rigidities. However, the cost is quite low - if price
rigidities are high, a household would only agree to give up 0.01% of her consumption each
quarter to live in a world with ﬂexible prices. This welfare cost is therefore negligible relative
to the welfare cost of the search externalities and relative to the welfare cost of the search costs.
















Figure 3: Welfare cost of search frictions
8 Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical model, where both wholesale and retail ﬁrms provide search
effort, i.e via advertising expenditures and employment of sales and purchasing managers) to23
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Figure 4: Welfare cost of matching externalities



















Figure 5: Welfare cost of adjusting prices24
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meet their customers in the product market. Firms form long-term contractual relationships
and bargain over prices. Our model departs from a standard RBC and makes two alterations.
First, we replace the Walrasian product market of the standard business cycle model by a prod-
uct market with search frictions and matching. Second, we introduce rigidities into the price
bargaining process. Downstream producers or wholesalers bargain over prices with upstream
retailers, who in turn sell to the ﬁnal consumers. Introducing these frictions in the product mar-
ket affects both the steady state equilibrium and the cyclical properties, such that the higher
the frictions, the lower the steady state quantities and prices. Moreover, frictions break the
strong correlation between variables in the standard RBC model, increase output persistence,
increase the volatility of employment and generate hump-shaped reactions for all variables.
Second, the model reproduces quite nicely the behaviour of prices and advertising expendi-
tures. Third, price rigidities have almost no effect on the cyclical properties of the real variables
andanegligiblewelfarecost. Frictionsbetweenwholesalersandretailersseemthereforecrucial
to understand business cycle ﬂuctuations.
The model could still be extended further. Taylor or Calvo contracts are likely to be more intu-
itive given the micro evidence on price adjustments which are lumpy and sizable. A monetary
dimension (see Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano et al. (2005)) and other real frictions
as imperfect labour market (see Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996)) are currently not included
in this model. Introducing these dimensions and comparing with the standard monopolistic
competition New Keynesian set up would be an exciting research programme. Moreover, the
aim of this paper is rather analytic (introduction of product market frictions and effects) but so
far nothing is said on the normative implications of our ﬁndings. For instance, given the strong
adverse effects of search frictions in the product market, policies aiming at reducing these im-
perfections (lower entry barriers, role of subsidies, taxation, trade associations, ...) might prove
powerful. On the other hand, based again on our results, lowering price rigidities seems less
important. Finally, we could use this setup to discriminate between product market and labour
market regulations (see for instance Messina (2006) or Fang and Rogerson (2007) for models
with monopolistic competition). We leave these extensions to future research.25
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A The social planners’s problem
Social planner









(1− Nt)1−η − 1
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subject to the constraints:









Tt = F(Kt, Nt)= tKα
t N1−α
t ,
Tt =( 1− χ)Tt−1 + M(St,Dt).
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Equivalence
The central planner’s equilibrium is equivalent to the decentralized equilibrium if and only if
the ﬁrst order conditions (P1)-(P2)-(P3) are equivalent to the ﬁrst order conditions (D4)-(D5)-
(D6). We see that equations (P1) and (D4) are always identical. We also see that γ = 1 − λ is a
sufﬁcient and necessary condition to ensure that the system of equations (P2)-(P3) is equivalent
to the system of equations (D5)-(D6).
B The standard Walrasian real business cycle model














t = Ct + Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,












C Quarterly US data
From 1971:q1 to 2006:q1.
Real producer price: Monthly PPI deﬂated by the monthly CPI. The monthly data are trans-
formed into quarterly ones. Source: BLS. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing
weight.
Advertising expenditures: Sum of quarterly advertising expenditures in newspaper (source:
http://www.naa.org/, seasonally adjusted using X12) and quarterly advertising expenditures
ininternet(source: http://www.iab.net/resources/ad_revenue.asp). ThesumisGDP-deﬂated,
logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
GDP: Quarterly gross domestic product. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600
smoothing weight.
Consumption: Quarterly total private consumption. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered30
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with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Investment: Quarterly total private investment. Source: BEA. Logged and HP-ﬁltered with a
1600 smoothing weight.
Employment: Quarterly employment in the non farm business sector. Source: BLS. Logged
and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Wages: Quarterly hourly compensation in the non farm business sector. Source: BLS. Logged
and HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.
Interest rate: Monthly 3-month Treasury bill nominal rate. Nominal rates are deﬂated by the
realized 3-month inﬂation rate. The monthly data are transformed into quarterly ones. Source:
Federale Reserve Bank of St Louis. HP-ﬁltered with a 1600 smoothing weight.31
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